First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Combining profound classical scholarship with striking anthropological and sociological insight, Cornford rejected the post-Darwinian rationalist assumption ...

A reprint of the Routledge edition of 1935.

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Original and engaging, this exploration of early Western philosophy traces the religious roots of science and systematic speculation. Author F. M. Cornford, a distinguished historian of ancient philosophy, combines deep classical scholarship with anthropological and sociological insights to examine the mythic precursors of enduring metaphysical concepts--such as destiny, God, the soul, substance, nature, and immortality. Cornford illustrates the rise of a new spirit of rational inquiry from traditional beliefs, demonstrating that philosophy’s modes of clear definition and explicit statement were already (...) implicit in the unreasoned intuitions of mythology. (shrink)

“Principium Sapientiae. Los orígenes del pensamiento filosófico griego” fue publicado póstumamente en 1952 y estaba prácticamente acabado, a salvo de algunos aspectos de los capítulos finales, cuando a Cornford le sobrevino la muerte. La edición ha sido preparada por W. K. C. Guthrie, que ha añadido una breve introducción y un apéndice. “Principium Sapientiae” ofrece una perspectiva general sobre el pensamiento de su autor a la vez que añade material nuevo a los trabajos anteriores. Hoy es ya una obra clásica.

Originally published in 1931, this volume contains the text of an inaugural lecture by Francis Cornford upon his accession to the Laurence Professorship of Ancient Philosophy in the University of Cambridge. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in ancient philosophy or the history and philosophy of science.

Topics discussed include Aristotle's semantics, individuation, essentialism, causation, & being. Contents: The Aporematic Approach to Primary Being in Metaphysics Z. Aristotle's Semantics & a Puzzle Concerning Change. Aristotle & Individuation. Singular Statements & Essentialism in Aristotle. What is Aristotle's Theory of Essence?. Aristotle on the Proximate Efficient Cause of Action. Causes as Necessary Conditions: Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisias & J.L. Mackie.

This is a study of Aristotle's moral philosophy as it is contained in the Nicomachean Ethics. Hardie examines the difficulties of the text; presents a map of inescapable philosophical questions; and brings out the ambiguities and critical disagreements on some central topics, inclduing happiness, the soul, the ethical mean, and the initiation of action.

The paper demonstrates a fifteen-point structural correspondence between plato's "republic" and aristotle's "nicomachean ethics". The more interesting points of correspondence are discussed, as are the three passages in each work that have no analogue in the other, and that are not explained by aristotle's dealing with politics in a different work. Possible explanations of this detailed correspondence are considered.

The Novum Organum, (or Novum Organum Scientiarum - "New Instrument of Science"), is a philosophical work by Francis Bacon, originally published in 1620. The title is a reference to Aristotle's work Organon, which was his treatise on logic and syllogism. In Novum Organum, Bacon details a new system of logic he believes to be superior to the old ways of syllogism. This is now known as the Baconian method.

The Novum Organum, (or Novum Organum Scientiarum - "New Instrument of Science"), is a philosophical work by Francis Bacon, originally published in 1620. The title is a reference to Aristotle's work Organon, which was his treatise on logic and syllogism. In Novum Organum, Bacon details a new system of logic he believes to be superior to the old ways of syllogism. This is now known as the Baconian method.

This chapter focuses on four areas Aristotle considered when determining what something really was, namely, essence, predicates, judgments, and potentials. Understanding and employing these concepts in our own concept of monster will help us avoid our currently tainted love of Supernatural. According to Aristotle, there are essential and accidental aspects of being. In the simplest terms, the essential aspects are the things that could not change about something, while the accidental aspects are things that could change. Aristotle's (...) third taxonomy of being is found in judgments of truth and falsity about a thing. These judgments can apply to questions of essence, accident, or any of the categories. Any question about the essential nature of monsters requires an answer that applies to all monsters. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Francis Sparshott TEXT AND PROCESS IN POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY Ir. H. Bradley in an optimistic moment described philosophy as an • unusually intense and sustained attempt to think clearly.1 If that is what it is, it is clearly a process; and, if it is a process, one does not see what a philosophical text could be. A text is surely not a process, though it may be the (...) product of one. A text that purported to be philosophy would deceive, as many of us complain that textbooks deceive, by substituting for the living endeavors of thought a series of slogans and purported conclusions the parroting of which demonstrates that thought has been evaded, not clarified. But there are such things as philosophical texts, and we could not easily do without them. They are, indeed, central to our experience ofwhat philosophy is. They must be doing some work, and it is up to us to establish what that work could be. 2. If philosophy is indeed a process of clarifying thought, it must in each of us be a self-critical monologue, and it must in the world be a manyvoiced conversation among Thaïes and his contemporaries and successors through history. (Similar traditions in other parts of the world constitute different conversations, in other corners of the room, and sometimes we eavesdrop on each other's conversations; but we will not be concerning ourselves witii them here.) A philosophical text should be a record of parts ofthat conversation, a minute ofthe long meeting ofminds. Without such a record the conversation could be no better than a bull session; we would be forever returning to the beginning, not to recover our origins but because memory had stretched to snapping. After all, what use would the clarification of thought be unless die progress won could be preserved? Philosophy begets philosophy as humanity begets humanity; there must be an Aristotelian efficient cause, a form-bearer. 2 Philosophy and Literature 3.As minute of the clarifying conversation, the text might serve the purpose of an interim conclusion, a tentative result. But not necessarily, and not if the clarity sought is indeed clarity in thinking. Minutes of decision-making bodies may record only the motions passed; but deliberating bodies often prefer to include in the minutes the arguments on either side, so that when they come to reconsider a matter on which a motion has been passed they may do so with renewed insight. A progress report may report only where one has progressed to, but it may also retrace the progression whereby die progress was made. So perhaps die best sort of text in philosophy is die sort I shall call a philosophoumenon, a text that recreates in and for the reader the experience ofclarification itself. But if this is to be done the reader must be sucked in: before clarification can be done, unclarity must be re-enacted. Confusion must be induced and its recognition must be enforced: the reader must be enticed not only to recognize but to undergo in person the Socratic elenchus, which for two millennia has ensured that the best philosophers shall be the best hated philosophers. To do its elenctic work, a philosophoumenal text must be deeply ambiguous, internally divided, blatantly self-contradictory. The Platonic dialogues are exemplary in this as in most ways: dramatic denunciations of drama, written disparagements of writing, conclusive proofs of the impotence of reason. But the other masters did the same: Descartes guides the reader of his Meditations step by step through the argument that is to lead the reader to doubt Descartes's existence; Aristotle invents and deploys a highly technical vocabulary which he never uses in the same way twice, and establishes a classification of intellectual methods into which none ofhis own work can be fitted; Wittgenstein obsessively philosophizes to show the folly of philosophizing, and carefully ensures diat his students circulate die content of the texts that he ostentatiously refuses to publish; Kierkegaard stridently claims authorship of his pseudonymous works so that he can repudiate them audioritatively; G. E. Moore accurately defines goodness so as to make it clear exactly what he is saying when he says that goodness is... (shrink)

2015 Reprint of 1960 Edition. Full facsimile of the original edition. Not reproduced with Optical Recognition Software. The "Novum Organum," full original title "Novum Organum Scientiarum" or 'new instrument of science', is a Bacon's landmark work scientific method. First published in 1620, the title is a reference to Aristotle's work "Organon," which was his treatise on logic and syllogism. Bacon outlines a new system of logic he believes to be superior to the old ways of syllogism. This is now (...) known as the Baconian method.For Bacon, finding the essence of a thing was a simple process of reduction, and the use of inductive reasoning. In finding the cause of a 'phenomenal nature' such as heat, one must list all of the situations where heat is found. Then another list should be drawn up, listing situations that are similar to those of the first list except for the lack of heat. A third table lists situations where heat can vary. The 'form nature', or cause, of heat must be that which is common to all instances in the first table, is lacking from all instances of the second table and varies by degree in instances of the third table. Bacon's work was instrumental in the historical development of the scientific method. Includes Bacon's Essay on "Great Instauration," and "Preparative Toward a Material and Experimental History.". (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Prudence: Classical Virtue, Postmodern PracticeFrancis A. BeerPrudence: Classical Virtue, Postmodern Practice. Ed. Robert Hariman. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003. Pp. xi + 337. $65.00, cloth."Would it be prudent?" The phrase echoes in memory, linking Dana Carvey from Saturday Night Live to the presidency of the first George Bush. Robert Hariman has been wrestling with prudence for over a decade, and he has now produced a powerful (...) volume that brings together not only his thoughts but also those of a number of other distinguished authors. The result is a book that will become a standard reference for those interested in prudence.The subtitle, Classical Virtue, Postmodern Practice, and the title of the first chapter, "Theory without Modernity," give some idea of the subtexts that drive the book. This is a book about prudence, and more. It is about virtue in classical, modern, and postmodern settings. It is about the dynamic complexity of practice—decision, judgment, and action in public and private life.Hariman gives us a definition: "Prudence is a mode of reasoning about contingent matters in order to select the best course of action" (5). That would be too easy. He also surrounds prudence with a penumbra of related words to broaden our understanding of the complex lattice of semantic meaning. Our legacy from the Greek and Roman lexicon includes words like phronesis and prudentia. Contemporary nouns involve cautiousness, circumspection, and care. Related adjectives are "careful, judicious, tactful, discerning, sensible, frugal, wise, sage, level-headed, balanced, moderate, politic, practical pragmatic, expedient" (vii). These synonyms, for Hariman, describe a narrow, modern form of prudence, part of the calculative tradition inherited from Aristotle, that ultimately leads to the saddle points of rational choice. They are, however, only a part of the story. Hariman aims to relieve their "stodginess" by recovering the performative tradition of prudence from Cicero. Prudence, from this perspective, is defined not just abstractly as a set of rules but more dynamically as a set of roles. Prudence includes character, and is performed by characters. Pericles in Athens is an iconic example of superb political leadership that blends the honor of the leader with the glory of the state. Prudence combines integrity of the self with respect for others. This is a broad, ambitious interpretation [End Page 176] of prudence. It recuperates not only a classical vision of prudence but also one of politics. It rearranges other virtues to revolve in a constellation around prudence. In this reconstituted form, prudence reemerges to shine as "a crucial element of political leadership," the central political virtue.The book is divided into three parts: "Conceptual Frameworks," "Rhetorical Structures," and "Provisional Networks." All three of the sections are identified in structural terms, which is interesting since Hariman's conception of prudence as a primary political virtue is very agent-centered. The structures, however, provide the settings in which the political observers and actors perform. The first section provides a sample of the rich literature that focuses on philosophical concepts of prudence in earlier times and places. It begins with a chapter by Robert W. Cape Jr. that discusses "Cicero and the Development of Political Practice in Rome." This chapter is critical to the book, since it lays a part of the foundation. It is the first substantive essay and it must also make the case for combining calculative and performative prudence. Cape gives us a fine exposition of prudentia in the Roman context. Interestingly, he suggests that "prudentia is a contraction of providentia, "'foresight.'" (37).The virtue of prudence was typically associated with age and experience. Imprudence, on the other hand, was associated with youth, recklessness, and impropriety (37). Prudence involved knowledge of practical matters, law, and custom as well as proper speech, including rhetoric, and behavior. Prepon mattered. Prudence for Cicero, however, was much more than simply knowing how things work: it was ultimately the extended performance of justice on the public stage. The next chapter, by Eugene Garver, entitled "After Virtù: Rhetoric, Prudence, and Moral Pluralism in Machiavelli," moves the story of prudence from the late classical to the early modern period. As the title indicates, Garver's concern is also with the relation of... (shrink)

In 1934 a most singular event occurred. Two papers were published on a topic that had (apparently) never before been written about, the authors had never been in contact with one another, and they had (apparently) no common intellectual background that would otherwise account for their mutual interest in this topic.1 These two papers formed the basis for a movement in logic which is by now the most common way of teaching elementary logic by far, and indeed is perhaps all (...) that is known in any detail about logic by a number of philosophers (especially in North America). This manner of proceeding in logic is called ‘natural deduction’. And in its own way the instigation of this style of logical proof is as important to the history of logic as the discovery of resolution by Robinson in 1965, or the discovery of the logistical method by Frege in 1879, or even the discovery of the syllogistic by Aristotle in the fourth century BC. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHIES OF AQUINAS AND AWOLOW0 1 FRANCIS I. 0GUNMODEDE Semlnary of SS. Peter and Paul Ibadan, Nigeria Introduction W:HAT POSSIBLE connection is there between the hought of Aquinas and that of Awolowo? We must first observe a sharp difference in personality and approach to politics between the two men. Obafemi Awolowo ( 1909-87) was a recent Nigerian philosopher and politician whose works on politics include The (...) People's Republic (1968) and Thoughts on the Nigerian Constitution ( 1970), among others.2 St. Thomas, on the other hand, was a medieval Italian priest who, because of his intensive academic pursuits and religious calling, did not engage in practical politics. In fact, it has been said that St. Thomas was the greatest philosopher that ever lived after Plato and Aristotle, but one without a political theory. This opinion is drawn from the fact that he has left no complete work on politics to which we can turn as we do to the Politics of Aristotle or to the Social Contract of Rousseau. Thomas never completed his Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle or his treatise De Regimine Principum (De regno). There is another good reason to say that St. Thomas does not provide his readers with an adequate political doctrine. This is 1 This is an adaptation of an original lecture titled "Elements of St. Thomas's Politics in Awolowo's Social Philosophy" given to mark Aquinas Day at the Dominican Institute of Philosophy, Ibadan, Nigeria on January 28, 1989. 2 For other works and writings by Awolowo, see F. Ogunmodede, Obafemi Awolowo's Socio-Political Philosophy (Rome, 1986), pp. 269-272. 265 266 FRANCIS I. OGUNMODEDE his " essentially theoretical " 3 approach to the study of politics. Aquinas's political reflections did not arise from any practical issue. The impact of philosophy was the determining factor. His views on state and government were part of a philosophical system. The approach of Awolowo to politics is quite different. It is empirical and practical. For, as D'Entreves says, modern man, unlike his medieval counterpart, has " become so entangled in particulars, in the practical side of politics, that it is only with an effort that we can be brought to realize the existence of the more general issues which lie behind our immediate predicament." 4 Nevertheless, one can relate the political thought of both men. History is already filled with cases of scientific discoveries made at the same time by men in different places without any prior knowledge of one another's achievements. For instance, the controversy over the discovery of calculus was resolved by crediting both Newton and Leibniz with the discovery at the same time, each in his own country. Perhaps we can add that fundamental ideas about man and society can be shared, because of their universal nature, by people in different ages, places, and circumstances. This is the basis for the present comparison of Awolowo 's and St. Thomas's socio-political philosophies. This position is favored by the fact that, whichever way one looks at it, both have a political theory, a set of propositions systematically related to one another in such a way and manner that it is meaningful and realistic for us to talk of a "theory." Perhaps the contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that Awolowo and Aquinas do share many basic ideas and concepts about reality, about religion, and especially about polity. This view is supported by the fact that, even though Awolowo wrote no treatise on metaphysics,5 as Aquinas did, he nonetheless built on sound 3 A. P. D'Entreves, Aquinas: Selected Political Writings (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1959), p. viii. 4 Ibid. 5 Unfortunately, Awolowo died before he could write works setting out his metaphysics systematically. But he gave a very long interview to Dr. Makinde of the 0.A.U., Ile-Ife, just before he died. This gives some insight into his AQUINAS AND AWOLOWO 267 fundamental postulates and principles which are metaphysical in nature in his thinking about politics.6 Now, there are many approaches and methods in the study of any political theorist. According to B. J. Dudley, " we can concern ourselves with the sort of assumptions... (shrink)

There has long been a need for a work on the philosophy of beauty treating fundamental problems against the background of the history of aesthetics--ancient and medieval as well as modern and contemporary. This book answers that need with the comprehensive presentations of an objectivist philosophy of beauty to balance the currently popular aesthetic subjectivism. It includes a synopsis of views and theories expressed on the various questions about beauty by philosophers down through the ages. Kovach's acquaintance with relevant literature (...) from the ancient Greeks to twentieth-century authors is staggering. He draws on the observations of thinkers from ancient times--Plato, Aristotle. Philo of Alexandria, Cicero, Plotinus, Augustine, Dionysius the Areopagite, and others; from medieval times--Alexander of Hales, John of la Rochelle, Thomas of York, Bonaventure, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Dionysius the Carthusian, and others; from modern times--Descartes, J. Addison, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Tolstoi, Santayana, Croce, Maritain, Sartre, H. Read, Thomas Munro, and others. With delicate precision Kovach systematically discusses the philosophy of beauty and the problems it raises. Whether or not one agrees with Kovach's objectivist position, no one in the field can afford to be without this book. (shrink)

La " philosophie politique " est le singulier croisement, effectué par Aristote, de deux produits de l'histoire grecque. Depuis lors, toute la pensée politique (de Machiavel à Marx, de Montesquieu à H. Arendt) se nourrit de celle d'Aristote. Il convenait d'analyser les livres fondateurs de cette pensée fondatrice pour en livrer à tous l'intention singulière et le sens universel. Les problèmes des cités où vécut Aristote ne sont sans doute pas ceux de nos Etats. Et pourtant les réflexions philosophiques d'Aristote (...) sur ces problèmes peuvent toujours éclairer nos questions. Tous les pouvoirs sont-ils du même type? Est-il naturel d'obéir? Qui doit commander? Quel est le meilleur régime? Qu'est-ce que la justice en politique? Qu'est-ce que la démocratie? Ceux-là mêmes qui ne veulent pas en entendre parler pourraient entendre quelles inquiétudes cache ce mot de " politique " " pourquoi vivre ensemble? " et " comment vivre ensemble? ". (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Antiphon on Time (B9 D-K)Francis M. DunnThe simplest and clearest formulation of Antiphon's understanding of time is the statement that time is a concept or measure, not a substance (87 B9 Diels-Kranz). This fragment is regularly cited in discussions of Antiphon, but Richard Sorabji has stated that it belongs not to Antiphon the sophist but to a minor peripatetic. He gives no argument in support of this statement,1 (...) but given the potential importance of this fragment both for the views of Antiphon and for early theories of time, we must consider whether or not its attribution is secure.Antiphon or Antiphanes?Fragment 9 in Diels-Kranz is a brief entry from the Placita of Aetius (1.22.6) under the heading, preserved in Stobaeus (1.8.40b):2P, F mrg., PhotiusIn the text of Diels-Kranz, emphasis is used to distinguish the quote or citation proper (νόημα ) from the gloss or clarification that accompanies it (). The distinction seems to me correct: since it is not immediately obvious what it means to regard time as a "concept or measure" (and two thinkers may have done so in different ways), the gloss is an attempt by the compiler to delimit this (shared) view. The delimiting term is relatively late ( with the implied meaning "substance" is not attested before Aristotle and Theophrastus; [End Page 65] cf. LSJ sv III). So if the first thinker cited is Antiphon the sophist, usage confirms that the term was later supplied by the compiler; on the other hand, if we suspend judgment on the identity of Antiphon (or Antiphanes), this late usage does not help to date the view that time is νόημα.This brings us to the attribution of the fragment: was Diels correct in printing? and was he correct in identifying this figure as the Athenian sophist? Taking the first question first, we must consider the possibility that the marginal gloss in F was meant as a correction, and that the lemma assigning the fragment to Antiphanes should be followed. Context, however, clearly indicates otherwise. Under the rubric, the compiler of the Placita3 has assembled the views of various philosophers: Plato, Xenocrates, Hestiaeus of Perinthus, Straton, Epicurus, Critolaus and the Stoics (1.22.1-7). Antiphon the sophist is repeatedly cited in this compilation (2.20.15, 2.28.4, 2.29.3, 3.16.4), whereas Antiphanes the comic poet is never cited at all. The textual confusion arose because this portion of the Placita was extracted by Stobaeus, who also quoted profusely from Antiphanes and other comic poets. To scribes copying Stobaeus, the playwright's name suggested itself more readily than that of the sophist, and the former therefore began to replace the latter.4I have assumed so far (as all editors have done) that the textual variants and entail a choice between Antiphon the sophist and Antiphanes the comic poet. Faced with such a choice, we must choose Antiphon, but Sorabji suggests a third alternative, namely that Antiphon or Antiphanes is a late and obscure peripatetic philosopher. What are the merits of such a suggestion?A Minor Peripatetic?Sorabji's Antiphon (or Antiphanes) is so obscure that he has otherwise vanished without leaving a trace. We must therefore decide if it is [End Page 66] likely that the Placita not only cited such an individual, but made no attempt to distinguish him from well-known authors who bore the same name. It is worth noting that the compiler of the Placita made no particular attempt to rescue from oblivion the beliefs of insignificant thinkers. Under each rubric he is chiefly concerned with reporting the doctrines of influential philosophers such as Thales, Democritus or Aristotle. The range of views on a given topic may be broadened by including lesser figures, but these are almost always easily identifiable and well-attested in other sources. The reasons for the flooding of the Nile (4.1), for example, are taken from Thales, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Eudoxus, Herodotus and Ephorus; the notion that the river is filled from a fresh-water sea is cited from a lesser figure, Euthymenes of Massilia, who is therefore identified by his place of birth... (shrink)